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America as Pattern 
and Problem 
by Carl E. Schneider 
Let us look to America, not in order to make a servile copy of the institutions that she 
has established, but to gain a clearer view of the polity that will be the best for us; let us 
look there less to find examples than instruction; let us borrow from her the principles, 
rather than the details, of her laws. The laws of the French republic may be, and ought 
to be in many cases, different from those which govern the United States; but the princi-
ples on which the American constitutions rest, those principles of order, of the balance of 
powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all re-
publics; they ought to be common to all . . . . 
-Alexis de Tocqueville 
Democracy in America 
Since the days of Tocqueville, for-eign observers have seen America 
as both a pattern and a problem. 
They still do, and in ways that illumi-
nate the way law deals with bioethical 
issues both here and abroad. America 
was long exceptional in having a written 
constitution, in allowing its courts the 
power of judicial review, and in letting 
courts exercise that power to develop 
and enforce principles of human rights. 
Today, that pattern looks markedly less 
exceptional. After the Second World 
War, Germany and Japan were persuad-
ed to adopt constitutions that included 
human rights provisions and that en-
dowed courts with the power to inter-
pret them. Since that time, a number of 
other countries-Canada, for exam-
ple-have also moved closer to the 
American constitutional pattern. 
Many countries, however, have not 
been content to borrow American con-
stitutional principles and practices. 
Their courts have also asserted their au-
thority to develop and enforce princi-
ples of human rights in two other ways. 
First, courts in many countries have as-
sumed jurisdiction over questions in-
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volving those rights by virtue of their 
duty to interpret treaties their countries 
have signed. Second, and strikingly, 
courts in many countries have come to 
see themselves as joint participants in 
the work of building an international 
body of human rights law. As my col-
league Christopher McCrudden writes 
in his fascinating study of this develop-
ment, "It is now commonplace for 
courts in one jurisdiction to refer exten-
sively to the decision of other courts in 
interpreting human-rights guarantees." 1 
This is where America has come to 
seem a problem to our foreign ob-
servers. For the United States has been 
irritatingly reluctant to sign these 
treaties, and American courts have been 
irritatingly unwilling to consult the de-
cisions of foreign courts. Why? 
The reasons are-obviously-vari-
ous. Foreign observers are not infre-
quently pleased to believe that Ameri-
cans are irredeemably provincial. (What 
do you call someone who speaks two 
languages? Bilingual. What do you call 
someone who speaks one language? 
American.) And it is perfectly true that, 
while lawyers in many countries are 
likely to have had some instruction in a 
foreign law (and even to have studied in 
a foreign country-often the United 
States), American lawyers have generally 
not been so blessed. To be sure, Ameri-
cans lawyers have less need. They work 
in the world's dominant economic 
power, one so vast that much more in-
ternal trade occurs within American 
boundaries than within any other in-
dustrialized country. American lawyers, 
to put the point differently, are more 
narrowly trained because-more than 
the lawyers in other countries-they 
can afford to be. 
Foreign observers also relish suggest-
ing that America has resisted signing 
some international human rights 
treaties because it is hopelessly arrogant 
and cannot believe it has anything to 
learn about human rights from abroad. 
It is surely true that American foreign 
policy has in recent decades often 
seemed loftily confident of its mission 
to bring the wretched heathen to the 
human rights light. But the reluctance 
to sign such treaties has other, less evi-
dent, roots as well. For one thing, a 
number of international human rights 
agreements have grown out of regional 
(and particularly European) efforts at 
economic and political integration, ef-
forts in which the United States has 
been, if anything, a competitor. More 
significantly, however, the government 
of the United States is-more than al-
most any foreign country's-federal. 
We confide many issues with human 
rights implications to the states, not the 
federal government. In addition, some 
Americans have opposed these treaties 
because they take them seriously 
enough to be uneasy about where judi-
cial interpretation will take their provi-
Sions. 
That the American executive and 
legislative branches have not leapt to en-
dorse human rights treaties may help 
explain why American judges have not 
felt encouraged to be guided by the de-
veloping international law of human 
rights that judges in many countries are 
creating. But two other factors are prob-
ably even more significant. First, the 
ethos of the American law stubbornly 
retains its common law inspiration, 
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while Europeans still find their inspira-
tion in civil law. This matters because 
the attempt to evolve a body of interna-
tional human rights law-in practice if 
not in necessity-seems more conso-
nant with the civil law than the com-
mon law. 
The common law grew out of the 
decisions of English judges in particular 
cases, while the civil law looks to gener-
al principles of law embodied in codes 
that are supposed to be systematic. The 
common law approach as Americans 
understand it is experimental, flexible, 
and pragmatic; it is of this time and of 
that place. It seeks to discover through 
social experiment what programs and 
practices in fact work for us here today. 
That is why Brandeis' description of the 
states as laboratories of democracy still 
appeals to us and why we still remember 
that Holmes said that the life of the law 
is not logic, it is experience. 
Proponents of civil law, on the other 
hand, with their allegiance to general 
principle, are more readily charmed by 
abstraction and broad assertions of 
principle. This difference in attitude has 
for some years been exemplified for me 
by an exchange I had with one of my 
German students. We had been dis-
cussing a nuisance case in which the 
court had sided with a plaintiff who had 
"come to the nuisance." My student 
protested that this violation of one of 
the common law's undoubted apho-
risms made the law "incoherent." I sug-
gested that it nevertheless made for 
good social policy. I could hardly have 
distressed her more. The law, she assev-
erated, must above all be a set of coher-
ent principles. I was pleased to be able 
to quote Goethe in my defense, which 
in Germany usually ends discussions: 
"Grau, theurer Freund, ist aile Theorie, 
und Griin des Lebens Goldner Baum" 
(Gray, dear friend, is all theory, and 
green life's golden tree). But she re-
mained unappeased and even horrified 
at the common law's betrayal of the idea 
of legal integrity. 
The civilians' taste for grand theory, 
their thirst for universal, timeless truths, 
perhaps explains how so much of the 
legal world can tolerate what to unre-
constructed common lawyers look sus-
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piciously like natural law ideas embod-
ied in contemporary treaties and the ju-
dicial opinions of many countries in 
human rights cases. When the common 
lawyer hears the kinds of expressions 
common in the defense of these treaties 
and opinions, when, for instance, the 
common lawyer is admonished to pro-
tect "human dignity," Jeremy Bentham's 
jibe springs irrepressibly to mind-that 
natural law is "nonsense on stilts." 
"Nonsense on stilts" rings true to 
common lawyers because they believe, 
again with Holmes, that general propo-
sitions do not decide concrete cases, 
that vague expressions of vast principles 
can be interpreted so variously that they 
neither instruct nor constrain judges, 
that natural law incorporates more 
rhetoric than reason. Postmodernism, 
structuralism, and their ilk appeal not at 
all to American judges, but they know 
vacuity when they see it. The "right of 
individual self-determination" is no 
doubt a fine thing, but what does it tell 
you, for example, about how implacable 
a duty of informed consent to impose 
on doctors? 
This leads me to what must in this 
cramped space be our last reason Amer-
ican judges have not swarmed to join 
their European-and even Common-
wealth-brethren in building a com-
mon law of human rights. The com-
mon law gives judges extraordinary lib-
erty to make law. But only in some 
areas, and only subject to the untram-
meled review of legislatures. Ultimately, 
as we understand the common law tra-
dition, it is democratic. How, we ask, is 
it democratically decent to hand over 
lawmaking power to unelected judges 
guided not by policy electorally estab-
lished, not by their understanding of 
their own people's law and tradition, 
but by what they and their upper mid-
dle class confreres from abroad think 
true at the end of the twentieth century? 
These questions about the role of 
unelected judges in a democracy have 
been honed to biting sharpness in the 
United States by our constitutional his-
tory. Through the New Deal, that was a 
history of judicial reaction. In recent 
decades, the direction of judicial ac-
tivism has shifted, but in ways that have 
provoked vehement and tumultuous 
dissent, as the words "Roe v. Wade" suf-
fice to remind us. This (probably unan-
ticipated) response and the changes in 
judicial personnel that the response has 
helped inspire have made the Supreme 
Court leery of expansive interpretations 
even of our o~n Constitution, much 
less of developing an international law 
of human rights that might lead the 
Court into who knows what thickets of 
brambles and briars. The Court's latest 
encounter with human rights in a 
bioethical context-the assisted suicide 
cases--exemplifies just this caution. In 
those cases the Court declined to articu-
late any broadly phrased right, post-
poned further decision until more em-
pirical evidence grows out of experi-
ence, and saluted the virtues of deci-
sions reached by state legislatures. The 
United States thus seems fated to re-
main-as it has long been-both pat-
tern and problem. 
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